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Dancing with the Dragon Heads: 
Enforcement, Innovations and Efficiency of Contracts 
between Agricultural Processors and Farmers in China 
 
Abstract: 
Contractual breaches are very common in developing countries such as China. In order to 
prevent breaches of contract, the contractual designs between farmers and agricultural processors 
(Dragon Head Firms) in China are innovating in two ways: organizational innovations and 
contractual innovations. Due to contractual innovations, simple price-quantity contracts are 
evolving into complex cooperation contracts. Using data for over 500 state key processors in 
2003 from the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, we construct econometric models to study 
contractual choices, contract intensity, and their impacts on sales and profits for agricultural 
processors in China. 
The results indicate that capital and the number of contracted farmers are endogenous to 
contract choices. Processors are more likely to use cooperation contracts compared with price-
quantity contracts as the number of contracted farmers increases, because the costs of 
coordinating, monitoring and enforcing price-quantity contracts may increase dramatically under 
these circumstances . On the other hand, contract types are not important for the number of 
contracted farmers, the intensity of contracts, or sales and profits for processors. The results also 
indicate that the elasticity of profits with respect to capital is 0.52, which implies that the returns 
to investing in the food processing industry are relatively high in China.  
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Dancing with the Dragon Heads: 
Enforcement, Innovations and Efficiency of Contracts 
between Agricultural Processors and Farmers in China 
 
Introduction 
Agricultural processors are called Dragon Head Firms (long tou qi ye) in China because 
they are considered the key to leading small farmers on the road to prosperity. While this may be 
an oversimplification, it is certainly true that improved marketing channels can increase farm 
incomes by reducing transaction costs, connecting farmers to a larger customer base, and 
opening up markets for more profitable products than the staples traditionally grown on Chinese 
farms. 
Starting with economic reforms in 1978, China has been transitioning from a planned 
economy to a market economy. The reform has fundamentally changed agricultural production 
and marketing organizations and systems. Under the planned economy, the state monopolized 
the purchase and marketing of agricultural products. Production and sales of agricultural 
products were based on state plans. After economic reforms, the government gradually 
overhauled regulations on agricultural production and marketing. Now farmers can and should 
make production and marketing decisions based on market information.  Facing an emerging 
market full of uncertainties, how can Chinese farmers survive and be prosperous? 
The government has realized the important role that processors play in a market economy, 
and has been helping improve marketing channels so as to increase farm incomes by promoting 
processors. The use of contracts for the production and marketing agricultural products is 
increasingly prevalent in China, similar to what is happening in other countries. According to the   3 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 39% of the total value of U.S. commodities in 2003 was 
produced or marketed under contracts (MacDonald and Korb 2006). And according to a survey 
in 2002 by Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, about 30% of the farmers used contracts to link 
themselves with processors and/or other marketing organizations, while that number in 1996 was 
less than 10% (Niu 2006). 
The current literature on contractual choices mainly focuses on incentives and risk 
sharing. Case studies of contracts between farmers and processors include chicken broiler 
contracts (Knoeber 1989, Knoeber and Thurman 1994), tomato contracts (Hueth and Ligon 
2002), fruit and vegetable contracts (Hueth et al. 1999), and sugar beet contracts (Hueth and 
Melkonya 2004), and hog contracts (Boger 2001).There is also a recent study by Jaenicke et al. 
(2007) that anlayzed contractual choices between farmers and processors for a range of different 
commodities.  
However, a key issue for contracts in China that the theoretical and empirical literature 
generally does not consider is enforcement.  Opportunistic behaviors by contracted parties are 
still the largest impediment to efficient market transactions in China (Tao and Zhu 2001; Zhou 
and Cao 2001, 2002). Current contract theory generally assumes that there is a well-functioning 
legal system under which any contract can be perfectly enforced by a court (Bolton and 
Dewatripont 2005). 
There are many cases where public institutions do not function well in enforcing 
contracts, in particular in transition economies (Gow and Swinnen 1998,2001). Gow, Streeter 
and Swinnen (2000) attribute breaches of contracts between growers and processors in transition 
economies to the absence or ineffectiveness of public institution in enforcing contracts. The 
situation in China is not quite the same as in other transition economies because of social   4 
relationships that step in to fill some of the roles taken by courts in other countries. As 
Chow(1997) points out, the Chinese legal system might be called a “semi-legal system”, and a 
contract under this legal system usually is enforced partly by an informal social relationship 
known as guanxi. Guanxi plays an important role in ensuring that a contract is honored. 
In contrast to the “shock therapy” of transition economies in Eastern Europe, China has 
been gradually transiting from a planned economy to a market economy. The reform of public 
enforcement institutions is not like what happened in other transition economies. Therefore, it 
may not be fully accurate to attribute breaches of contracts in China to the failure of public 
enforcement institutions as Gow, Streeter and Swinnen (2000) suggested in general for transition 
economies. 
Even when enforcing a contract is possible it might be very costly. High costs may 
weaken enforcement of contracts. The parties to a contract might be very opportunistic when 
enforcement of contracts is very costly. This paper suggests that the absence of effective contract 
enforcement in China may result from the high costs of enforcing contracts, rather than a failure 
of public enforcement institutions. 
China has a large number of very small farms. As a result, the monetary value of a 
contract between a farmer and a processor is often very small. If a farmer breaches a contract, the 
processor could only get a little from suing the farmer but the processor could incur significant 
court costs. If a processor breaches a contract, the farmer usually cannot pay the high court costs 
of suing the processor. Opportunistic behaviors by both farmers and processes have been quite 
prevalent since the start of economic reforms. This is very inefficient because it increases 
transaction costs and hurts long-term relationships between farmers and processors.   5 
As noted above, contractual design in China is evolving from simple price-quantity 
contracts to complicated contracts to prevent opportunistic behaviors by the parties to the 
contract. The objective of this paper is to explore this process of contractual innovations. In this 
paper, we empirically analyze innovations in agricultural contracts in China and the impacts of 
these innovations on farmers and processors. 
 
Opportunistic Behaviors and Innovations of Contracts 
•  Opportunistic Behaviors 
China has a large number of very small farms. The land in general is equally divided 
among farmers. Property rights to agricultural land cannot be traded in the market by law. In 
2005, China had 252 million farms, and the land area per farmer was only 2.08 mu (about 0.14 
hectare)
1. More than 80% of hogs are produced in backyard farms, and many backyard farms 
only raise 1 to 5 hogs in simple housing (Pan and Kinsey 2002). 
After the emergence of a market economy full of uncertainties, particularly in the late 
1980s, farmers and processors began to enter into price-quantity contracts in order to share risk 
between them, under which farmers supply a certain amount of agricultural outputs at specified 
prices to processors after harvest (Zhou and Cao 2001). They also can be viewed as forward 
contracts. Due to small farm sizes, the contracted amount in the typical contract was very small 
compared with the U.S. and other Western countries, and each processor usually had a large 
number of contracted farmers. 
[Insert Figure 1 ] 
                                                 
1 China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 2006 (Tables 13-14).   6 
Simple price-quantity contracts are very difficult to enforce because the opportunistic 
behaviors are very prevalent. As shown in Figure 1, suppose the contracted price for some 
commodity is  C P . After harvesting, if the market price  M P  is different from  C P , opportunistic 
behaviors by either farmers or processors may occur. Suppose the court cost for each case is  L C . 
If  MH PP =  which is higher than  C P , farmers may breach their contracts and sell their 
outputs directly to the market for higher profits. The benefit to the farmer from such 
opportunistic behavior DE , as shown in Figure 1, which equals the loss to the processor. If 
L DEC < , as one would expect given the small size of the typical contract, the processor has no 
incentive to sue. 
On the other hand, if  ML PP =  which is lower than  C P , processors may breach their 
contracts and buy commodities directly from the at lower prices. The benefit from breaching a 
contract to the processor is AB, which is equivalent to the loss to the farmer.  If  L ABC < , as one 
would expect, the farmer has no incentive to sue. 
Such opportunistic behaviors were very prevalent in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
They even can be seen in China in more recent years (Zhou and Cao 2001). From a long-run 
perspective, such opportunistic behaviors hurt both farmers and processors, because risks cannot 
be transferred via a contract and the trust between farmers and processors is damaged. 
In order to make more reliable contracts, the simple price-quantity contracts between 
farmers and processors began to innovate in two directions: organizational innovations and 
contractual innovations.  
[Insert Figure 2.a and 2.b] 
•  Organizational Innovations   7 
Organizational innovations, as shown in Figure 2.a, involve establishing a mediating 
organization between farmers and processors. Such a mediating organization could be either a 
broker or a cooperative. Processors can make contracts with brokers or cooperatives, then 
brokers or cooperatives can make contracts with farmers. For two reasons, these organizational 
innovations can significantly reduce opportunistic behaviors relative to direct contracts between 
farmers and processors. 
First, the contracted amount between a processor and a mediating organization is much 
larger than that between a processor and a farm. This increases the potential benefit from suing a 
breaching party in court. 
Second, a contract between a farmer and a mediating organization also becomes more 
reliable, because the personal relationship (guanxi), as Chow (1997) suggested, usually works 
well and makes contracted parties honor the terms of a contract. If a farmer breaches the contract, 
the punishment may be outside of the contract itself, and sometimes would be very severe, 
because his reputation and credit would be damaged in the whole village or community.  
•  Contractual Innovations 
 Gow and Swinnen (2001) suggest that breaches of contracts can be prevented by 
designing “self-enforcing” contracts involving so-called “hold-ups” such that the private losses 
from breaching a contract outweigh potential benefits. The literature on contracts (e.g. Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian 1978;  Klein 1996) views hold-ups a as a very useful tool to prevent 
contract breaches. Gow and Swinnen (1998, 2001) found that foreign companies in transaction 
economies typically use hold-ups to prevent breaches of contracts. Gow and Swinnen (1998, 
2001) suggested that processors can hold up farmers by providing seeds, new techniques and 
other inputs and services. If farmers breach contracts, the services will not be supplied in the   8 
following years. Contractual innovations in China are consistent with these findings, as shown in 
Figure 2.b. 
Moreover, in the case of China, some contractual innovations stipulate that processors 
will return some profits to farmers as compensation, particularly when the contract price is lower 
than the market price. Such flexible institutional arrangements can share more risks between 
processors and farmers, and increase utility for both parties in the long-run if they are risk averse. 
In China, these types of contracts are known as cooperation contracts.  
Some contracts require that farmers invest or deposit money with processors. This type of 
contract usually is called a joint-stock cooperation contract. In some sense the farmers become 
part owners of the processors, and they can affect the behaviors of managers in processing firms. 
Broadly speaking, this is a kind of vertical integration through which farmers integrate 
processors. Similar to cooperation contracts, processors return some profits to farmers as 
dividends. This measure also can effectively prevent both contracted parties from breaching.  
•  Some Hypotheses  
From the analysis above, we can state four hypotheses: 
(1)  The number of contracted farmers for each processor is endogenous to the choice 
among contracts, because the contracts are designed simultaneously by farmers and 
processors. 
(2)  As the number of contracted farmers increases, processors are more likely to choose 
cooperation or joint-stock cooperation contracts. In the case of simple price-quantity 
contracts, as the number of contracted farmers increases, the cost of monitoring and 
enforcing contracts also increases, and the probability of breaching contracts also   9 
increases. Processors are more likely to choose cooperation or joint-stock 
cooperation contracts to hold up farmers and share risks with them. 
(3)  The capital stock of processors and contract types are endogenous to the choice 
among contracts. Investments or deposits required in joint-stock cooperation 
contracts can be used as capital by processors. 
(4)  Controlling for the type of contracts and a processor’s sales, the profits of a 
processor are negatively correlated with the number of contracted farmers. In the 
case of simple price-quantity contracts, as the number of contracted farmers 
increases, the costs of monitoring or enforcing contracts will increase, and more 
farmers may breach contracts. In the case of cooperation or joint-stock cooperation 
contracts, some profits will be returned to farmers by the contracts. 
In the rest of this paper, we use micro data for over 500 state key processors in China, 
made available by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, in order to test these hypotheses. We 




The data used in this study include basic information about production and financial 
reports for 561 state key processors
2 in 2003. In total, there are 582 state key processors, of 
                                                 
2 The criteria by which a processor is certified as a state key agricultural processor are listed in Provisional Rules on 
Certificating and Supervising The State Key Agricultural Processors (nong ye chan ye hua guo jia zhong dian long 
tou qi ye ren ding he yun xing jian ce guan li zan xing ban fa (nong jing fa [2001] No.4])), which was issued by The 
Ministry of Agriculture of China in 2001. This law has nine articles laying out the requirements for a processor to be 
a state key processor, such as firm scale, annual sales, operational details, the number of related farmers, credit 
scores and so on.   For instance, the capital stock and the annual sales should not be less than 100 million and 150 
million yuan, respectively; the number of related farmers should not be less than 3000 in eastern provinces; and the 
processor’s credit score should not be less than “A”.    10 
which data for 21 are missing. In the following analysis, we also may drop some item-missing 
samples. Details on the variables used in this study are in the Appendix. 
Though there are three types of contracts, each processor in practice typically uses only 
one type of contract. As shown in Table 1, leaving aside 35 processors whose contract types are 
unknown, only two processors used mixed types of contracts. Out of the 524 remaining 
processors, 474 used price-quantity contracts. This indicates that price-quantity contracts are still 
the dominant type of contract among key processors in China, even though they are more likely 
to be breached. Cooperation contracts were used by 43 processors, while 7 used joint-stock 
cooperation contracts. Given the small number of joint-stock cooperation contracts, they are 
grouped together with cooperation contracts under the heading “cooperation contracts” for 
analytical purposes.  
The average numbers of contracted farmers for price-quantity contracts and cooperation 
contracts are 95,023 and 102,254, respectively. There are 88 processors for meats, 124 for grains, 
44 for dairy goods, and 57 for vegetables. The average number of contracted farmers for dairy 
processors is 20,512, less than others; the numbers for meat processors, grain processors, and 
vegetable processors are 124,914, 96,585, and 116,179, respectively. A possible explanation for 
the relatively small number of contracted dairy farms is that dairy farms are not widespread in 
China, because the sector was in the past dominated by large state-owned dairy operations 
(Främling 2006). However, the number of contracted farms for dairy processors is expected to 
increase as the demand for milk in China increases.  
Most processors (296 of the 561) are privately owned, and the average number of 
contracts is 71,476. There are only 28 foreign processors, and their average number of contracted 
farmers is 50,606, which lower than domestic processors. There are 58 processors which are   11 
publicly owned, and the average number of contracts for them is 195,926, much higher than 
other types of ownership. 
In the next section, we construct econometric models to test the above-mentioned 
hypotheses. 
 
Contract Choices  
First, we study the contract choices for processors. A probit model is suggested as 
follows: 
*
















1i y  is a random utility function for processor i.When 
*
1 0 i y ‡ , the processor uses price-
quantity contracts; otherwise, the processor uses cooperation contracts.  1i Z is a vector of 
exogenous variables; 1i A is a vector of endogenous variables;  1 b  and  1 g are corresponding vectors 
of coefficients for  1i Z  and  1i A .  1i e  is an error term with a standard normal distribution  (0,1) N . 
We construct three models to test the hypotheses of exogeneity of capital and the number 
of contracted farmers. We use last year’s profit as an instrumental variable for capital, because 
the change in the stock of the capital is correlated with profit in the previous year. We use last 
year’s profit, fixed assets, and the credit score of the firm as instrumental variables for the 
number of contracted farmers, because we assume that farmers can observe these variables. 
In general, there are two methods to estimate a probit model with endogenous variables: 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and Amemiya’ generalized-two-stage-least-squares 
estimation (G2SLS) (Amemiya 1978, Newey 1987). Newey (1987) points out that MLE is much   12 
more efficient than G2SLS. Rivers and Vuong (1988) suggest a Wald test to test the hypotheses 
of exogeneity of  1i A  by regressing the error terms in the structural form with the error terms in 
the reduced form. 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the three models by MLE and G2SLS, and the 
results from an ordinary probit model are also reported for comparison. In model 1.A, capital is 
assumed endogenous; in model 1.B, the number of contracted farmers is endogenous; and in 
model 1.C, both capital and the number of contracted farmers are endogenous. Rivers and 
Vuong’s test (1988) rejects the hypotheses of exogeneity in all three models. These results 
support the hypothesis that both capital and the number of contracted farmers are endogenous. 
The results indicate that contract types may be simultaneously determined by farmers and 
processors. 
Model 1.C, in which both the capital and the number of contracted farmers are 
endogenous, is the best among the three models. There are no large differences between the 
estimation results of MLE and G2SLS. The results show that only the coefficients for the number 
of contracted farmers and public-ownership are statistically significant. 
The negative sign of the coefficient for the number of contracted farmers implies that as 
the number of contracted farmers increases, processors are more likely to choose cooperation 
contracts. China has a large number of small farms, and the land, in general, is equally divided 
among farmers. In the case of simple price-quantity contracts, as the number of contracted 
farmers increases, the costs of coordinating, monitoring and enforcing contracts increase, and the 
probability of breaching contracts also increases. In this situation, processors are more likely to 
choose cooperation contracts to hold up farmers and share risks with farmers.   13 
The type of ownership of a processor is important for contractual choices. In particular, 
publicly-owned processors are more likely to choose price-quantity contracts, because their risks 
can be born by the public due to the nature of public ownership of the firms. 
 
The Number of Contracted Farmers 
The model of contractual choices indicates that the number of contracted farmers and 
contract choices are endogenous. We suggest the following econometric model for studying the 
number of contracted farmers:  
22222 () iii lnFarmersZA bge =++  (2) 
where  () lnFarmers  is the logarithm of the number of contracted farmers;  2i Z is a vector of  
exogenous variables for a processor i that can be observed by farmers (for example, we assume 
farmers can observe fixed assets, but cannot observe the processor’s capital stock); and  2i A is a 
vector of endogenous variables.  2 b  and  2 g are corresponding vectors of coefficients for  2i Z  and  
2i A .  2i e  is an error term with a normal distribution 
2
2 (0,) N s . 
Since the model of contractual choices rejected the exogeneity hypothesis of the number 
of farmers, contract types and the number of contracted farmers may be simultaneously 
determined. The contract type might be an endogenous variable in the equation for the number of 
contracted farmers. Instrumental variable regressions are suggested. Though the contract type is 
a discrete variable, the ordinary instrumental-variables method is consistent in this case 
(Wooldridge 2002).  
We report the instrumental-variable estimation results in Table 3. The estimation results 
by OLS are also reported for comparison.   14 
The estimation results indicate that locality, operational details, ownership and fixed 
assets are important for the number of contracted farmers. If processors are located in major 
cities and far away from farmers, the number of contracted farmers is less than those located in 
small towns or villages. A possible explanation is that an increase in the distance between 
farmers and processors increases transaction costs due to asymmetric information and higher 
transportation costs, which may hinder the development of contracts between farmers and 
processors. 
Consistent with the descriptive statistics, dairy processors have fewer contracts than other 
types of processors. In contrast to traditional commodities such as grains, meats and vegetables, 
dairy is still a relatively new industry in rural China, and dairy farmers are not widely spread 
(Främling 2006). It is also reasonable that foreign processors have fewer contracts than other 
types of ownerships, because they are newcomers to the market and it will take them more time 
to build relationships with farmers. 
The estimation results also show that the value of fixed assets for processors is positively 
related to the number of contracted farmers. Fixed assets have two effects: (1) more fixed assets 
implies the scale of a processor is larger and the processor needs to contract with more farmers 
for inputs; (2) the fixed assets can be viewed as collateral for contracts and can attract more 
farmers. 
 
Intensity of Contract Purchase 
Though contracts are widely used by processors for buying inputs, some processors may 
purchase inputs directly from the market when the contracted supply is not sufficient for 
production. Jaenicke et al. (2007) analyze the intensity of contract purchase for agricultural   15 
processors in Pennsylvania. Their method is used here for analyzing the intensity of contract 
purchase for agricultural processors in China. The econometric model is given as follows:   
33333 iiii SZA bge =++            0100 i S ££  (3) 
where   i S  is the percent of contracted purchases to total purchases, and  0100 i S ££ . That is,  i S  
is left censored at 0 and right censored at 100.  3i Z  is a vector of  exogenous variables for a 
processor i which can be observed by farmers; for instance, we assume farmers can observe 
fixed assets, but cannot observe capital; and 3i A is a vector of endogenous variables.  3 b  and  3 g are 
corresponding vectors of coefficients for  3i Z  and  3i A .  3i e  is an error term with a normal 
distribution 
2
3 (0,) N s . 
Similar to Jaenicke et al. (2007), tobit models can be used here to estimate equation (3). 
In contrast to Jaenicke et al. (2007), we include some potentially endogenous variables and then 
test for endogeneity. The potential endogenous variables are contract types and the number of 
contracted farmers. We also can use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and Amemiya’s 
generalized-two-stage-least-squares estimation (G2SLS) (Amemiya 1979, Smith and Blundell 
1986, Newey 1987) to estimate the tobit model with endogenous variables. Smith and Blundell 
(1986) also suggested a Wald test to test the endogeneity in a tobit model. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results. Wald tests of models 3.E and 3.F cannot reject the 
exogeneity of contract types or the logarithm of the number of the contracted farmers. Hence, we 
can estimate the model with a standard tobit model.  
The results for model 3.D show that only the coefficients of the dairy dummy variable, 
the logarithm of capital and the R&D dummy variable are statistically significant; all have 
positive signs. The positive sign on the coefficient for dairy processors implies that dairy   16 
processors are more likely to use contracts to purchase their inputs, perhaps because they usually 
need a stable supply of milk from dairy farmers. 
The capital variable serves as a proxy for the scale of a processor. The positive sign on 
the capital variable implies that larger processors are more likely to use contracts to stabilize the 
supply of inputs. 
The positive sign of the R&D dummy variable indicates that processors who have R&D 
departments tend to have a higher contract intensity. A possible explanation might be that R&D 
departments for processors can hold up farmers, and farmers are more likely to sign long-term 
contracts with processors.  
 
Sales and Profits of Processors 
In this section we analyze whether contract types and the number contracted farmers 

















where  4i Z  and  5i Z are vectors of independent variables, and  4 b  and  5 b are the corresponding 
vectors of coefficients.  4i e  and  5i e  are error terms, respectively, with normal distributions 
2
4 (0,) N s  and 
2
5 (0,) N s . 
If  45 ii ZZ = , equations (4) and (5) become a triangular system of equations. Without 
imposing some restrictions on  4i e  and  5i e , equation (5) is not identified. Here, we assume  4i e  
and  5i e  are uncorrelated. We can use OLS to consistently estimate the two equations respectively. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 5, respectively, for models 4.A and 4.B. For   17 
comparison, we also report the estimation results for a profit function without controlling for sale 
values. That all 
2 R  values are over 0.4 implies that the models fit reasonably well. The main 
findings for the sale and profit functions are as follows. 
First, we find that the coefficient on contract type is not statistically significant either for 
sales or for profits, while the coefficient on the number of contracted farmers is statistically 
significant in for both equations. Interestingly, the signs of the coefficients for the logarithm of 
the number of contracted farmers are different. A positive sign for sales implies that sales of 
processors increase as the number of contracted farmers increases. On the other hand, a negative 
sign for profits implies that profits decrease as the number of contracted farmers increase. A 
possible reason might be that an increase in the number of contracted farmers increases the 
transaction costs of coordinating, monitoring and enforcing contracts, which may lower profits 
for processors. 
Second, the coefficient on the dummy variable for city location is negative in both the 
sales function and the profit function, and only the coefficient in the profit function is statistically 
significant (at the 10% level). This implies that processors located in major cities and far away 
from farmers are less profitable than those located in small towns or rural areas. A possible 
explanation is that the distance between farmers and processors increases transaction costs due to 
asymmetric information and higher transportation costs. 
Third, operational details also affect sales and profits for processors. Only the coefficients 
for the meat dummy variable and the grains dummy variable are statistically significant, and are 
estimated at 0.18 and 0.24 in the sales function, respectively. These results imply that sales for 
grain processors are larger than those for meat and other processors. Only the coefficients for the 
dairy dummy variable and the meat dummy variable are statistically significant in the profit   18 
function, and are -0.37 and -0.21, respectively. This implies that profits for dairy and meat 
processors are in general lower than for other types of processors. 
Fourth, ownership is important for both sales and profits. Our results show that the 
coefficients for the dummy variables of publicly-owned, foreign and privately-owned processors 
are all statistically significant, and they are 0.56, 0.50 and 0.29, respectively. This implies that 
publicly-owned processors have higher sales than other ownership structures in China, perhaps 
resulting from a higher loyalty on the part of farmers built up over a long history. Only the 
coefficient for the dummy variable for publicly-owned processors is statistically significant and 
is -0.72. This implies that publicly-owned processors have a lower profitability than processors 
with other types of ownership structure. This might be explained by the fact that the workers and 
managers in publicly-owned processors may be less motivated due to ambiguity of ownership 
rights and soft budgets, as one generally observes in publicly-owned firms. This is one important 
reason why China is moving from a planned economy to a market economy. 
Fifth, the dummy variable for export licenses is only statistically significant in the profit 
function and not in the sales function. In particular, export licenses are negatively correlated with 
profits.  One possible explanation for this finding is that agricultural products face highly 
competitive world markets, particularly after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Exporting 
agricultural products entails higher costs than selling on the domestic market, and under these 
circumstances would be used to dispose of products that could not be sold on the domestic 
market. An alternative explanation is that exporters are holding export prices down now in order 
to build up markets over time in other countries. 
Sixth, capital plays an important role in both sale and profit functions. Specifically, the 
elasticities of sales and profits with respect to capital are 0.60 and 0.52, respectively, and both   19 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The latter value implies that the returns to investing in 
the food processing industry are relatively high in China. 
Finally, the coefficients for the dummy variable for R&D are also statistically significant 
in both the sales and profit functions. A negative sign for the coefficient in the sales function and 
a positive sign in the profit function imply that processors with R&D departments lower sales but 
higher profits. Hence, the results indicate that investments in R&D improve profits for 
processors in China, even though they are associated with lower sales. 
 
Conclusions 
Contracts are widely used by agricultural processors for purchasing inputs not only in 
developed countries but also in developing countries such as China. In order to prevent 
opportunistic behaviors which may cause breaches of contracts and threaten the efficiency of 
contracts, the contractual design of simple price-quantity contracts in China have been evolving 
in two directions: organizational innovations and contractual innovations. Organizational 
innovations involve intermediate organizations, such as cooperatives or brokers, placed in 
between farmers and processors. Contractual innovations involve the evolution of price-quantity 
contracts into complex cooperation contracts to hold up the parties to a contract. Currently, price-
quantity contracts are still very prevalent in China. 
Using data for over 500 state key processors in 2003 from the Chinese Ministry of 
Agriculture, we construct econometric models to study contract choices, contract intensity, and 
the impacts on sales and profits of processors. 
The results indicate that capital and the number of contracted farmers are endogenous to 
contract choices. This suggests that contract types may be simultaneously determined by farmers   20 
and processors. In particular, processors are more likely to choose cooperation contracts 
compared with price-quantity contracts as the number of contracted farmers increases, because 
the costs of coordinating, monitoring and enforcing price-quantity contracts may increase 
dramatically under these circumstances. 
On the other hand, contract types are not important for the number of contracted farmers, 
the intensity of contracts, or sales and profits for processors. 
Ownership structure is very important for contract choices, sales and profits of processors. 
In particular, publicly-owned processors are more likely to use price-quantity contracts, and have 
larger sales but lower profitability. This might be explained by the fact that the risks of publicly-
owned processors can be born by the public, and the workers and managers in publicly-owned 
processors may be less motivated due to ambiguity of ownership rights and soft budgets, as one 
generally observes in publicly-owned firms. This is one important reason for China moving from 
a planned economy to a market economy. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the elasticity of profits with respect to capital is 0.52, 
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Appendix  
Variable explanations: 
Contract Type: 1—a price-quantity contract; 0—a cooperation contract or a joint-stock 
cooperation contract; 
Capital: capital in the current year (billion yuan); 
Farmers: contracted farmers (1000 farmers);  
City Location: 1—Located in major cities; 0—Located in small towns or villages;  
Dairy: 1—a dairy processor, 0—others;  
Meat: 1 —a meat processor, 0— others; 
Grain: 1 –a grain processor, 0— others;  
Vegetables: 1 –a vegetable processor, 0— others;  
Publicly-Owned: 1–a publicly—owned processor, 0— others; 
Foreign: 1–a foreign processor, 0— others;  
Privately-Owned: 1–a privately-owned processor, 0— others;  
Export: 1—a processor with an export license; 0—others;  
Green Food: 1— a processor producing green food; 0—others; 
R&D: 1— a processor with a department of research and development.  
Fixed Assets: value of fixed assets in current year (million yuan); 
Credit Score: 3—AAA, 2—AA, 1—A, 0—others; 
Sale: value of sales in previous year (10 thousand yuan); 
Last Year’s Profit: profits in previous year (10 thousand yuan); 
Profit: profits in the current year (10 thousand yuan); 
Contract intensity: percent of total processed quantity accounted for by contracts.   22 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for 561 State Key Processors 
 
  No. of Processors 
Average No. of Contracted Farmers 
for Each Processor 
Contract Types     
      Price-Quantity Contracts  474  95,023 
      Cooperation Contracts  43  113,349 
      Joint-Stock Cooperation Contracts  7  34,096 
      Price-Quantity Contracts 
      and Cooperation Contracts  1  15,000 
      Price-Quantity  Contracts 
   and  Joint-Stock Cooperation Contracts  1  22,100 
       Unknown  35  86,150 
Operational Details     
       Meat  88  124,914 
       Grains  124  96,585 
       Dairy  44  20,512 
       Vegetables  57  116,179 
       Others  248  91,091 
Ownership     
       Public  58  195,926 
       Foreign  28  50,606 
       Private  296  71,476 
       Others  179  106,502 
Total  561  94,579 
 
   28 
Table 2. Estimation Results for Contract Choices for Processors 
 
Model  1.A  Model  1.B  Model  1.C 
Probit  IV-MLE  IV-G2SLS  Probit  IV-MLE  IV-G2SLS  Probit  IV-MLE  IV-G2SLS  Contract Type 
Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio Coef.  t-ratio Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio 
Capital  -0.0254  -0.88  -0.1537 -3.15*** -0.1669 -2.77***                  -0.0260  -0.91  0.0052  0.20  0.0101  0.19 
Farmers                  0.0003  0.57 -0.0030 -5.45*** -0.0058 -2.18** 0.0004  0.60  -0.0031 -5.51*** -0.0061  -2.05** 
City Location -0.0838  -0.48  -0.0405  -0.23 -0.0439  -0.23 -0.0856 -0.49  -0.1594  -1.26 -0.3067  -1.18 -0.0816  -0.46  -0.1609  -1.28  -0.3215  -1.18 
Dairy  0.2298  0.62 0.2090  0.59 0.2270  0.59 0.2360  0.64 -0.0201  -0.07 -0.0364  -0.07 0.2450  0.66  -0.0282  -0.10  -0.0546  -0.10 
Meat  0.1563  0.66 0.1081  0.47 0.1174  0.47 0.1517  0.64 0.1844  1.07  0.3549  1.03 0.1494  0.63  0.1839  1.07  0.3677  1.03 
Grain  0.3564  1.51 0.2743  1.20 0.2978  1.21 0.3611  1.54 0.2031  1.18  0.3927  1.23 0.3499  1.48  0.1984  1.17  0.3982  1.22 
Vegetables  0.4207  1.20 0.5233  1.30 0.5682  1.30 0.4225  1.21 0.2534  0.90  0.4915  0.95 0.4266  1.22  0.2440  0.87  0.4910  0.93 
Publicly-Owned 0.3290  0.97 0.7095  1.95* 0.7703  1.92* 0.2622  0.79 0.6105  2.46** 1.1745  2.09**  0.3211  0.94  0.5947  2.37**  1.1898  2.05** 
Foreign  0.4812  1.01 1.3705  1.12 1.4881  1.10 0.4829  1.02 0.7075  0.95  1.3611  0.91 0.4991  1.05  0.7265  0.90  1.4519  0.87 
Privately-Owned  0.1278  0.68 0.1146  0.63 0.1244  0.63 0.1294  0.68 -0.0039  -0.03 -0.0060  -0.02 0.1351  0.71  -0.0087  -0.06  -0.0162  -0.06 
Export  0.1440  0.60 0.2015  0.87 0.2188  0.87 0.1264  0.53 0.1222  0.70  0.2356  0.69 0.1353  0.56  0.1182  0.69  0.2368  0.68 
Green Food  0.2073  1.19 0.2651  1.55 0.2879  1.55 0.1973  1.14 0.0578  0.43  0.1129  0.45 0.2040  1.17  0.0497  0.37  0.1010  0.39 
R&D  -0.1644  -0.44  -0.1291  -0.36 -0.1402  -0.36 -0.1462 -0.39  -0.0980  -0.38 -0.1889  -0.38 -0.1444  -0.39  -0.0987  -0.39  -0.1977  -0.39 
Intercept  1.0459 2.30** 0.9288  2.13**  1.0085  2.13**  1.0094 2.20** 0.8451  2.50** 1.6295  2.38**  1.0038 2.18** 0.8359  2.48**  1.6740  2.33** 
Wald Test for 
Exogeneity        χ
2(1)= 8.76***  χ
2 (1)=  8.10***          χ
2 (1)= 12.89***   χ
2 (1)= 9.56***         χ
2 (2)= 67.03***   χ
2 (2)= 7.88** 
Sample Size  456  454  455  455  449  449  453  449  449 
 
  Note: (1) ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(2) Profits last year as an instrument for capital. 
(3) Fixed assets, last year’s profit, and credit score as instruments for the number of contracted farmers.   29 
Table 3. Estimation Results for the Number of Contracted Farmers 
 
2.A OLS  2.B OLS  2.C IV Regression  Ln(Farmers) 
  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio 
Contract Type      -0.0444  -0.20  -1.1833  -0.35 
City Location  -0.3191  -2.29**  -0.3205  -2.30**  -0.3469  -1.93* 
Dairy  -0.8424  -4.12***  -0.8407  -4.10***  -0.8910  -3.98*** 
Meat  -0.1193  -0.62  -0.1188  -0.62  -0.1161  -0.56 
Grain  0.3566  1.94*  0.3582  1.95*  0.3724  1.41 
Vegetables  0.2888  1.11  0.2907  1.12  0.2649  0.89 
Publicly-Owned  0.3764  1.41  0.3800  1.42  0.3345  0.95 
Foreign  -0.6770  -2.67***  -0.6732  -2.64***  -0.6465  -1.92* 
Privately-Owned  -0.0528  -0.34  -0.0515  -0.33  -0.0528  -0.34 
Ln (Fixed Assets)  0.4069  4.24***  0.4068  4.24***  0.4330  4.49*** 
Ln(Last Year Profit)  0.0072  0.09  0.0063  0.07  -0.0804  -0.75 
Credit Score  0.0417  0.42  0.0413  0.42  -0.0008  -0.01 
R&D  -0.1151  -0.41  -0.1157  -0.42  -0.1579  -0.52 
Intercept  6.3818  8.00***  6.4294  7.63***  7.9987  1.99** 
R
2  0.1355  0.1356  0.0815 
Sample Size  491  491  443 
 
Note: (1) ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
                     (2) The export license and green food dummy variablesare used as instruments for contract type.   30 
Table 4. Estimation Results for the Intensity of Contracts for Processors 
 
Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  3.E [Endog. Contract ]  3.F [Endog. Ln(Contracted Farm) ] 
3.A  3.B  3.C  3.D  IVTobit-G2SLS  IVTobit-MLE IVTobit-G2SLS  IVTobit-MLE 
Share 
 
Coef. t-ratio  Coef.  T  Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio 
Ln (Farmers)      0.1549  0.19      0.1488  0.18  0.3937 0.33  0.2421  0.18 -2.1846  -0.35 0.9637  0.15 
Contract Type          4.1227  1.02  4.2554  1.05  77.6848  1.03 110.4793  1.25 4.7814  1.16 1.0516  0.30 
City Location -0.9230  -0.38 -0.6814  -0.28 -0.7879  -0.33  -0.5406  -0.22  1.8717 0.49  1.4789  0.34 -1.8580  -0.49 -1.2250  -0.34 
Dairy  9.4003  2.04**  9.6512  2.08**  9.2798  2.01**  9.5219  2.06**  9.4352 1.38  8.0273  1.02 8.5054  1.40 10.0350  1.78* 
Meat  3.6176  1.08 4.1051  1.22 3.5614  1.07  4.0581  1.21  3.6106 0.72 -1.3762 -0.24  4.2681  1.25 0.9491  0.31 
Grain  -2.5915  -0.87 -2.4138  -0.80 -2.7023  -0.90  -2.5227  -0.83  -5.1573  -0.95  -2.1713 -0.35  -0.8829  -0.19 1.2458  0.29 
Vegetables  1.0974  0.25 1.3104  0.30 0.9030  0.20  1.1123  0.25  -2.6386  -0.38  -10.0752  -1.23  1.5720  0.30 -3.9887  -0.84 
Publicly-Owned -2.5646  -0.61 -2.8670  -0.68 -2.9426  -0.70  -3.2619  -0.77  -9.1666  -1.11  -9.3098 -0.97  -2.4855  -0.51 -1.5684  -0.37 
Foreign  5.4987  0.99 5.2913  0.95 5.1539  0.93  4.9256  0.89  0.1063 0.01 -6.5071 -0.61  4.2826  0.67 1.5659  0.26 
Privately-Owned 0.9546  0.36 0.7389  0.28 0.8218  0.31  0.5975  0.22  0.1759 0.05  2.5088  0.58 1.3509  0.49 3.7514  1.55 
Ln (Capital)  2.9098  2.50**  3.0584 2.55*** 3.0023 2.58*** 3.1570 2.63***  6.1422 2.04**  6.9752 1.99**  3.6843  1.63 2.7204  1.24 
R & D  8.0476  1.57 9.6483  1.86* 8.2392  1.61  9.8462  1.90*  12.9297  1.64*  17.4266 1.91*  11.7064 2.15** 13.3469 2.86*** 
Constant  50.0294 3.73*** 45.2698 3.09*** 45.2681 3.19*** 40.3860 2.63*** -62.4948  -0.64  -114.1443  -0.99  55.9176  1.21 23.8105  0.52 
Wald Test for 
Exogeneity                  χ
2(1) =1.68  χ
2(1) =1.55  χ
2(1) =0.11  χ
2(1) =0.00 
Sample Size  475  472  475  472  428  462 
 
  Note:  (1) ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(2) The export license and green food dummy variables are used as instruments for contract type. 
(3) The logarithm of fixed assets, the logarithm of last year’s profit, and credit score are used as instruments for the logarithm 
of the number of contracted farmers.   31 
Table 5. Estimation Results for the Sale and Profit Functions for Processors 
 
  4.A Ln(Sales)  4.B Ln(Profit)  4.C Ln(Profit) 
  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio 
Ln(Sales)      0.4042  7.83***     
Ln (Farmers)  0.1203  4.82***  -0.0502  -1.83*  -0.0029  -0.10 
Contract Type  -0.1231  -0.97  0.1567  1.14  0.1291  0.88 
City Location  -0.1035  -1.37  -0.1558  -1.92*  -0.1942  -2.24** 
Dairy  -0.1536  -0.97  -0.3682  -2.16**  -0.4317  -2.38*** 
Meat  0.1821  1.77*  -0.2134  -1.93*  -0.1373  -1.17 
Grain  0.2443  2.57***  -0.1408  -1.36  -0.0405  -0.37 
Vegetables  0.2096  1.63  -0.1114  -0.80  -0.0254  -0.17 
Publicly-Owned  0.5608  4.22***  -0.7222  -4.89***  -0.5104  -3.30*** 
Foreign  0.5029  3.04***  -0.1611  -0.90  0.0407  0.21 
Privately-Owned  0.2871  3.40***  -0.0760  -0.83  0.0401  0.41 
Export  -0.1717  -1.60  -0.3322  -2.88***  -0.4035  -3.29*** 
Green Food  -0.0968  -1.27  0.0367  0.45  -0.0079  -0.09 
Ln(Capital)  0.5982  16.20***  0.5162  10.16***  0.7625  17.91*** 
R & D  -0.4515  -3.06***  0.4243  2.60***  0.2305  1.34 
Intercept  3.3853  7.33***  -1.6812  -3.20***  -0.3533  -0.67 
R
2  0.4907  0.5211  0.4535 
Sample Size  453  450  450 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 